Towards Secure Mobile P2P Systems by Walkerdine, J. & Lock, Simon
Towards Secure Mobile P2P Systems 
 
James Walkerdine, Simon Lock 
Computing Department 
Lancaster University 





The growth of mobile devices with near PC equivalent 
capabilities has brought with it the possibility of mobile P2P 
systems. However, the nature of mobile devices brings 
additional issues that need to be considered, especially for 
when considering system security. This paper presents our 
initial work on the EU funded PEPERS project that seeks to 
support the development of secure mobile P2P applications. 
A core part of this support is with the design and development 
of a mobile P2P security platform. 
 
1. Introduction 
The rapid growth of mobile devices with ever 
increasing functionality has brought with it the 
possibility of mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. More 
recently, advances in wireless networking and mobile 
computing technologies, such as wireless LANs, 
wireless mesh networks and 3G cellular networks have 
further facilitated the migration of the P2P paradigm 
into wireless mobile computing. The combination of 
mobile and P2P technologies could be ideal for 
organisations that possess characteristics such as, 
decentralised management styles, geographically 
dispersed or highly mobile workforces, a wide range of 
computing and communications devices, etc. 
The ad-hoc and heterogeneous nature of mobile P2P 
systems, however, can present significant challenges to 
application designers - particularly when it comes to 
security and privacy. Within a mobile P2P system, not 
only must encryption be employed, but also robust 
authentication procedures are required for connecting 
trusted and non-trusted devices with each other - a task 
that can be difficult in decentralised environments 
where connection to a trusted authority is not 
guaranteed.  
A further problem within organisational 
environments is how to ensure company security policy 
is applied to all devices (for example personal laptops, 
PDA's or flash memory). Traditionally, security 
policies and enforcement mechanisms have 
predominantly been developed for centrally managed 
environments - additional techniques will be required 
to allow these to be applied to distributed, mobile and 
intermittently connected platforms. 
The EU funded PEPERS (Mobile Peer-to-Peer 
Security Infrastructure) project seeks to address these 
concerns and will develop an infrastructure for the 
design, development and operational deployment of 
secure mobile peer-to-peer applications. A key aspect 
of this is the design and development of a generic 
mobile P2P security platform that is able to handle 
aspects of system functionality such as identity 
management, data confidentiality, authentication, 
access control, privacy and application validation. This 
paper presents an overview of the platform.  
The paper is split into two main sections. We begin 
with a discussion of the requirements that were 
identified for the security platform. We then present 
our design of the platform and an example to illustrate 
how it can be utilised.  
2. Requirements for a Mobile P2P 
Security Platform 
To help in the design and evaluation of the security 
platform, the PEPERS consortium includes two 
industrial user partners who wish to use P2P 
technology to support their own business practices. One 
of these is a major international security firm who 
wishes to support their guards in communicating and 
sharing information with each other whilst on patrol. 
The second is a media company who wishes to allow 
their journalists, photographers and editors to work 
together in the creation of magazines. In both cases the 
companies wish to use P2P to support secure 
communication and data exchange between their 
personnel, who may be geographically dispersed or 
particularly mobile, and may only have access to 
mobile devices (i.e., the security guards and 
journalists).  
One of the initial activities within PEPERS was to 
gather requirements to help inform the design of the 
security platform. This process comprised of three 
activities; studying scenarios of the user partner's work 
practices in order to identify desired functionality/ 
requirements; assessing available technologies and how 
they can impact on the platform; and drawing on our 
previous experiences from the P2P ARCHITECT 
project [1]. In the case of the latter activity, within P2P 
ARCHITECT we had investigated how best to support 
the development of dependable P2P systems. Within 
PEPERS we plan to build on this work, whilst focusing 
specifically on secure mobile P2P system development. 
As a result of these activities, a set of platform 
requirements were identified, a high level overview of 
which are presented in Table 1. 
As can be seen, aside from the typical P2P 
functionality and security requirements, the elicitation 
process also revealed some interesting additional 
requirements. Of particular importance was the notion 
of data life and activity logging. The user partners 
wanted to make sure that security critical data could not 
remain on a device when outside the parameters of its 
intended use. For example, door access codes would 
only exist on the device within a certain time frame and  
within a certain location (the locality of the door). 
Likewise the users activities performed whilst using the  
system should also be securely and reliably logged, not 
only to support accountability but also to help detect 
tampering  with the system.  
The use of mobile devices also resulted in 
additional requirements that deal with determining their 
functional attributes and their physical location. This 
was particularly important for the security firm who 
wanted to be able to track the location of their guards. 
Likewise it is also important from a general P2P 
perspective where knowledge of a device's ability (and 
of those in the locality) can influence decisions such as 
where data should be routed, stored, etc.  For example, 
to avoid routing messages via a device with low battery 
or limited bandwidth. 
 
3. Designing a Mobile P2P Security 
Platform 
A key issue in the development of security 
mechanisms for ad-hoc mobile P2P systems is the 
adaptation of existing (largely centralised) security 
approaches. Although the distributed and decentralised 
nature of many P2P systems can provide benefits such 
as resilience and reliability, the fact that the majority 
lack centralised control presents a challenge. 
Existing work within the area of P2P security has 
tended to focus on individual aspects. Berket et al. [2] 
developed a distributed PKI mechanism for ensuring 
confidentiality, communication integrity and access 
control within P2P based information sharing systems. 
Agarwal et al. [3] developed the Secure Group Layer to 
support secure distributed communications. Likewise, 
JXTA/Poblano [4], Tran et al., [5], Ye et al. [6] have all 
attempted to tackle various aspects of P2P security. 
Although these developments are all beneficial they are 
limited in that they do not provide a complete security 
solution.  
If secure mobile P2P applications are to be 
developed then it would be beneficial if a single, 
inclusive security toolkit could be drawn upon. Within 
PEPERS we are aiming to achieve this by developing a 
secure mobile P2P platform. 
When designing a secure P2P runtime platform for 
mobile devices it is critical to take into account the 
properties and impact of the underlying technology. 
The use of mobile technology as a foundation for the 
Requirement Comments 
Standard P2P functionality 
 
Standard functionality expected by a P2P system/API, including: Peer Discovery, Publication, 
Searching, Unique Addressing, Peer Groups and Distributed storage  
Standard security features 
 
Fundamental aspects of the security platform including: Secure communication, Encryption, 
Authentication, Certificate management, Data integrity and Reputation mechanisms 
Support the notion of data life  In some situations it is desirable for secure data (for example, door access codes) to cease 
existing should certain conditions apply (for example, mobile device leaving the relevant 
location or being on the device for too long a time) 
Authentication based on 
temporal / geographic 
constraints 
To provide lifetime control on temporary authorisation / delegation of authorisation by proxy 
to third parties 
Be able to physically locate 
peers 
Within a mobile environment not only can it be important to locate peers over the network, but 
also to locate them physically (for example, two guards with PDA's performing separate 
patrols in a warehouse) 
Data fault tolerance/integrity 
support, failure recovery 
mechanisms 
Utilising redundancy within the system to promote data fault tolerance. 
Allowing a peer to recover its data or state should it fail. This could include backup with 
restore, or roll back mechanisms  
Discover detailed mobile peer 
information 
Not just whether or not a peer is active on the network, but also the peers functionality and 
'mobile' properties (for example, battery life, memory, etc). This is particularly important for 
mobile P2P systems (for example, you do not want to route messages to a mobile peer that is 
about to shut down due to low power) 
Support different network 
topologies 
P2P systems can be built on different type of underlying network topology. The security 
platform should be flexible enough to support this. 
Device and protocol 
independent 
Able to operate on a range of mobile devices (Mobile, PDA, Laptops, etc) and over a range of 
operating systems. Able to utilise different underlying protocols and technology (for example, 
JXTA). 
Provision of reliable logging 
mechanism 
To help support accountability and auditability the platform should provide secure logging 
mechanisms. Logs should possess access rights and be replicated across peers to ensure 
redundancy. Logging should be tamper proof. 
Table 1 - A selection of key Requirements for the Mobile P2P Security Platform 
platform presents a number of interesting challenges, 
with some of the key ones being: 
• Communication cost - Unless a special 
arrangement has been made with a network 
provider, using the mobile phone network to 
communicate data between peers will cost money. 
As a consequence, this form of communication 
should be kept to a minimum within any platform 
that is designed. Alternatives include using Wi-Fi 
and Bluetooth, however these possess more limited 
range capabilities. 
• Battery life - Battery life is critical in mobile 
devices and needs to be maximised. Any form of 
computational or communication activity requires 
additional CPU cycles, which in turn draws on 
battery power. To prolong battery life such 
activities must be minimised and the design of any 
platform needs to reflect this. 
• Resources and capabilities - Available mobile 
technology can differ significantly in the amount 
of resources they possess and in the capabilities 
they offer. Limited resources can impact on the 
feasibility of providing certain functionality within 
the platform. The design of the platform should 
therefore provide flexibility, allowing for 
lightweight implementations to be built where 
required. 
 
The consideration of issues such as these can 
impact not only on the core design of the platform, but 
also on the choice of underlying topology that it would 
utilise. Certainly within a mobile system, adopting a 
fully decentralised topology is likely to be a costly 
approach (in terms of battery life) due to the additional 
overhead required for routing messages, managing 
system security, etc. Likewise mobile devices are not 
ideal for performing computationally heavy activities 
(for example, key generation for use in encryption), and 
so the platform may benefit from the inclusion of one 
or more super peers within the network. To cope with 
the different possible topologies that may be used, 
within PEPERS we are designing our platform to be 
topology independent.  
4. The PEPERS Runtime Platform 
Based on the identified requirements, a design for a 
more inclusive secure mobile P2P platform has been 
developed. The intention is for developers to build their 
own P2P applications on top of this platform and utilise 
the services it offers. As shown in the requirements, a 
key objective is for it to be generic enough to allow its 
use on different devices (mobile, PDA's, Laptops, etc), 
on different OS's (Symbian, Win CE, Linux etc), and 
being flexible enough to work with different protocols 
and topologies. 
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic overview of the 
proposed PEPERS Platform. Not only has the design 
been informed by the identified requirements, but also 
from the structures of existing P2P based platforms 
(such as JXTA). Principally a layered design has been 
used, with the security layer representing the most 
significant part of the platform. To help simplify the 
design of this layer, it has been broken down into a set 
of modules that represent key functionality that the 
runtime platform should provide (for example, 
encryption, authentication, etc). Interfaces for each 
module will be well defined allowing them to 
communicate with each other should one or more be 
used. Such interfaces will typically be APIs that can be 
accessed from within the security platform or, where 
Figure 1 - High-level design overview of the PEPERS runtime platform 
applicable, externally from the application layer. The 
modules have been categorised as being core (C), 
because they are core to the platforms operation, and 
optional (O), because they represent additional 
functionalities. 
The development of a high-level design is necessary 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, it assists in the process 
of developing an inclusive security platform, but more 
importantly it provides the flexibility to work with 
existing security technologies and developments. It is 
not feasible, nor desirable, for PEPERS to develop all 
the technologies that would be required within a mobile 
security platform. Instead we want to draw on existing 
techniques and bring them together under a common 
umbrella. A consequence of this is that, certainly at this 
stage, for some modules desired functionality 
descriptions may be more important than detailed 
designs - to allow for the identification and selection of 
suitable existing technologies. 
We will now provide a brief overview of this high-
level design.  
OS Abstraction Layer 
The Operating System Abstraction Layer aims to 
bridge the gap between the underlying OS and the 
PEPERS runtime platform. It can be viewed as 
providing two key roles: 
• Abstracting OS access to ensure platform 
independence - a requirement was for the platform 
to run on a variety of operating systems. The OS 
abstraction layer brings all operating systems up to 
the same standard and thus aids portability of the 
higher layers of the framework. 
• Expose relevant functionality that is provided by 
the underlying OS - this is to reflect the fact some 
of the desired functionality may already by 
provided by the OS. 
P2P Network Layer 
As has been discussed in our previous work [7], 
numerous topologies and protocols exist upon which 
P2P systems can be built. These types of topology can 
provide different advantages and disadvantages 
depending on the requirements of the desired system. 
Because it is foreseen that different styles of topology 
may be adopted, the PEPERS runtime platform needs 
to be generic and flexible enough to cope with either. 
This layer therefore seeks to provide a generic 
abstraction over the different P2P protocols and 
topologies that could be used within a mobile P2P 
environment. A common interface would be provided 
to the Security layer that could be accessed by the 
relevant modules (for example, the P2P 
Communication Module). 
Security Layer 
The Security Layer represents the bulk of the 
PEPERS platform. It contains the core functionality for 
providing a secure mobile P2P framework, on which 
applications can then be built. 
Because of the breadth of functionality provided by 
the Security Layer, it has been broken down into a 
modular structure. The use of a modular approach 
provides a number of advantages: 
• Expandability - new modules can be added at a 
later date. 
• Customisability - the fact that some modules are 
optional means that they can be excluded from an 
implementation if, for example, they are not 
needed or device storage space is limited. 
• Interoperability - the modular nature means that 
applications can interact with them independently 
or, potentially, modules can be overridden by 
similar functionality provided by the application. 
For example, if the application developers wants to 
use different encryption methods than what is 
provided by the PEPERS platform. 
• Modularity – by separating functionality into 
modules and policing communication between 
those modules, it is possible to achieve a higher 
level of security. The interfaces between the 
modules act as firebreaks so that if one becomes 
compromised it is less likely to propagate to the 
other modules. 
Security management module 
The module administers the security for the whole 
runtime platform. It sets the security settings (where 
applicable) for the other modules within the security 
layer, and essentially acts as a 'front end' for these 
modules. This includes setting the lifetime for data files 
and peer group security properties. 
Device information lookup module 
The module allows the application (or PEPERS 
platform) to discover information about the device it is 
running on (e.g., resources, geographical location, etc). 
When used in conjunction with the P2P Comms 
module, this could be extended to discovering 
information about other devices within the peer group. 
This last point can be particularly important if decisions 
need to be made on where to route or backup data to. 
Obviously what information is made available will be 
dependent on the security settings of the device and 
PEPERS platform. 
Platform management module 
This module handles the general administration of 
the whole PEPERS runtime environment. It manages 
the modules within the Security Layer, allowing new 
ones to be integrated within the platform should they be 
developed. It also handles the initiation and the 
shutdown of the platform. 
P2P Comms module 
This module provides all the P2P functionality that 
would be required by the platform. It handles 
publication, discovery, communication and general P2P 
management (for example, peer groups, and network 
organisation). This module would aim to be protocol 
independent in structure (and in the API it provides), 
and draw upon the functionality provided by the P2P 
Network Layer. 
Data repository module 
This module seeks to provide a secure and reliable 
data repository that is distributed across the P2P 
network. Within fully decentralised systems data would 
be replicated across peers so that it has a high 
availability (if peers go offline, etc). A more centralised 
approach could be adopted, although this will make this 
module largely redundant. The repository must be 
secure so that un-authorised access to the data cannot 
happen, and all access should be logged. 
Peer recovery module 
This module provides recovery facilities for peers 
should they fail. Such facilities would allow a peer to 
roll back to a previous state and also to retrieve lost 
data. For a fully decentralised system this will involve 
state and data information being duplicated across the 
network. For a more centralised system, such 
information could be stored in a central location. 
Trust (reputation) module 
This module provides trust mechanisms for the 
PEPERS platform. Reputation based mechanisms are 
the more commonly used method for representing trust 
within a P2P system and are likely to be most suitable 
for use in the runtime platform. For a fully 
decentralised system this will involve reputation 
information being duplicated across the network. For a 
more centralised system, such information could be 
stored in a central location. The Trust module, itself, 
would be generic in that it can be utilised not just by 
the runtime platform but also by the applications that 
are built on top. As a consequence, the Trust module 
also needs to be secure so that the reputation data 
cannot be tampered with or misused.  
Logging module 
This module provides a logging mechanism for the 
PEPERS platform that can be used to assist 
accountability and general security. As with the Trust 
module, the Logging module would be generic so that 
it can be utilised not just by the runtime platform but 
also by the applications that are built on top. It is also 
vital for the module to be secure - only authorised users 
should be able to view or edit relevant logs. Likewise 
logs should be encrypted to stop tampering. For the 
PEPERS platform all communication and internal 
activities of the platform would be logged. With a fully 
decentralised system logging information should be 
duplicated across the network and could utilise the Data 
Repository module. For a more centralised system, 
such information could be stored in a central location. 
Dynamic Verification Framework (DVF) 
Alongside the development of the mobile P2P 
security platform, the PEPERS project is also seeking 
to develop frameworks to support the static and 
dynamic verification of applications that are built to 
utilise it. 
This module deals with the management of 
formalised descriptions of acceptable behaviour 
(created at design time) and the monitoring of the 
activities of the application/platform to ensure that it 
conforms to this description. The module will also have 
the ability to take appropriate actions when deviations 
from this behaviour are detected. 
Authentication and Authorisation module 
This module provides authentication and 
authorisation facilities for the PEPERS runtime 
platform. It supports the secure authentication of both 
users and devices, and enforces (role based) access 
control rights based on permissions for data and 
services. The mobile nature of the devices makes user 
authentication particularly important - for example, to 
stop a criminal who has stolen a device from retrieving 
security codes from it. Both centralised and distributed 
approaches should be supported to reflect the fact that 
mobile devices may not always be in contact with a 
central point. 
Encryption module 
This module provides facilities to support the 
encryption and decryption of data within the runtime 
platform. This can include data that is stored on the 
actual devices and also the communication between 
devices. It also includes support for the use of digital 
signatures. Both centralised and decentralised 
encryption mechanisms should be provided. 
Data lifetime module 
The notion of data lifetime was identified as an 
important feature from the user requirements. Data that 
could reside on a device may be so sensitive that it 
should only be accessed within certain environment 
conditions. For example, within a certain time period or 
a certain location. This module supports this feature 
and keeps track of the 'environmental conditions' for 
the device.  
5. Implementing and Using the PEPERS 
Platform 
The previous sections have provided a high-level 
design overview of the PEPERS platform. We have 
begun work on providing a more detailed design of 
some of these modules and this will be done along side 
initial implementation work. The PEPERS platform is 
to be implemented to work with Symbian OS 9 and will 
be deployed and evaluated on a range of Symbian 
based mobile devices. That being said, the core aspects 
of the framework will be implemented in a platform 
independent manner allowing for their transference to 
other platforms at a future date. Where possible, 
existing technologies and developments will be 
utilised, with the mobile version of JXTA being used as 
a basis for P2P communication. Symbian OS also 
provides a powerful set of security features and these 
will be exploited by the PEPERS platform. 
As we have already mentioned, the intention is for 
developers to utilise the PEPERS platform as a 
foundation for their own secure mobile P2P 
applications.  To support this, within PEPERS there is 
also a second stream of work that focuses on 
supporting the development of secure mobile P2P 
applications. As part of this we have designed a 
development methodology that guides the developer 
through the various stages of the development process 
(requirements elicitation, design, implementation, etc), 
and a set of application reference architectures that can 
inform the design process.  
The reference architectures provide guidance to 
developers on what modules (and structure) are 
typically required for different types of P2P mobile 
application domain and network topologies. Although 
these reference architectures can be utilised 
independently, they also indicate which modules of the 
PEPERS platform can be drawn upon to provide 
specific functionality. Figure 2 shows one of the 
reference architectures we have developed for the 
“Shared Workspace” application domain. The darker 
coloured modules indicate those that could have 
functionality provided for by the PEPERS platform.  
Alongside this, tool support is also to be provided 
that will help guide designers through the development 
process, and help inform their decisions with regards to 
suitable network topologies and reference architectures. 
The development methodology, reference architectures 
and supporting tools will be described in a future paper. 
6. Summary and Future Work  
This paper has presented our work within the 
PEPERS project, which seeks to support the 
development of secure mobile P2P applications. A core 
component of the project is the development of a 
secure mobile P2P platform that can be used as a basis 
for the development of mobile P2P applications. This 
platform encapsulates a range of core functionalities 
that developers can then utilise within their own 
applications.  
Initial work has focused on identifying 
requirements for this platform and the development of a 
high-level design - both of which have been presented 
in this paper. The focus will now move on to further 
detailing parts of the design and implementing the 
platform for use on Symbian OS based devices. The 
platform and development support before will then be 
used within two real world user partner developments.  
The evaluation of the developed platform, along 
with the supporting application development 
methodology, will be documented in due course. 
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Figure 2 - A Shared Workspace Reference Architecture 
